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Alex Osberghaus
- 27 March 2026
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3210Details
- Abstract
- Banks use synthetic risk transfers (SRTs) to offload potential losses in their loan portfolios to non-bank investors while retaining the loans on their balance sheets. We investigate this trillion-euro market using transaction-level data from the euro area, the largest SRT market, and highlight three channels of potential risks to financial stability. First, we show that banks synthetically transfer loans that are capital-expensive relative to their riskiness. To establish causality, we exploit a regulation that causes a jump in the risk weights of loans without affecting their riskiness. As banks redeploy the freed capital, their loan portfolios become riskier relative to their capitalization. Second, after entering an SRT, banks reduce their monitoring efforts compared to other banks lending to the same firm. The reduction in monitoring is greater the larger the share of their firm exposure that banks synthetically transfer. Third, banks and non-bank investors are interconnected. Banks are more likely to sell SRTs to investors with whom they already have credit relationship.
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 11 November 2025
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3149Details
- Abstract
- Banks can grant loans to firms bilaterally or in syndicates. We study this choice by combining bilateral loan data with syndicated loan data. We show that loan size alone does not adequately explain syndication. Instead, banks’ ability to manage risks and firm riskiness drive the choice to syndicate. Banks are more likely to syndicate loans if their risk-bearing capacity is low and if screening and monitoring come at a high cost. Syndicated loans are more expensive and more sensitive to loan risk than bilateral loans. Our findings contradict the hypothesis that reputable borrowers graduate to the syndicated loan market.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E63 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Stabilization, Treasury Policy
F45 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages