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Wolf Heinrich Reuter

15 December 2015
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1872
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Abstract
In this paper we analyse the interaction of fiscal rules and fiscal space. We find strong evidence for fiscal rules being associated with higher fiscal space. Furthermore, the analysis shows that countries with more fiscal space tend to have higher discretionary expenditures, but that this effect is significantly reduced if fiscal rules are in place. A similar effect can be observed for the procyclicality of fiscal policy, which is significantly higher in an environment of ample fiscal space, while this difference is reduced with fiscal rules. Regarding the different types of fiscal rules, we find the strongest results for expenditure rules and to a lesser extent for balanced budget rules, but none for debt rules.
JEL Code
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
H60 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→General
11 September 2013
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1588
Details
Abstract
This study analyses the link between fiscal frameworks and their budgetary impact. We look at different features of national numerical fiscal rules in combination with fiscal councils and medium-term budgeting frameworks. We construct our own time-varying dataset for national fiscal frameworks for the period 1990-2012 covering all 27 EU Member States and estimate a dynamic panel on aggregate and disaggregated fiscal policy variables. We find strong support that numerical fiscal rules help to improve the primary balance, and that the budgetary impact can be further strengthened when supported by independent fiscal councils and an effective medium-term budgeting framework.
JEL Code
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
H60 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→General
Annexes
11 September 2013
ANNEX