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Jörg Rocholl

26 June 2015
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1821
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Abstract
This paper identifies the effect of financing constraints on firms
JEL Code
D92 : Microeconomics→Intertemporal Choice→Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
J23 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Demand and Supply of Labor→Labor Demand
J31 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs→Wage Level and Structure, Wage Differentials
17 November 2011
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1395
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the importance of retail consumers' banking relationships for loan defaults using a unique, comprehensive dataset of over one million loans by savings banks in Germany. We find that loans of retail customers, who have a relationship with their savings bank prior to applying for a loan, default significantly less than customers with no prior relationship. We find relationships matter in different forms, scope, and depth. Importantly, though, even the simplest forms of relationships such as transaction accounts are economically meaningful in reducing defaults, even after controlling for other borrower characteristics as well as internal and external credit scores. Our results suggest that relationships of all kinds have inherent private information and are valuable in screening, in monitoring, and in reducing consumers' incentives to default.
JEL Code
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
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ECB Lamfalussy Fellowship Programme
1 September 2011
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1376
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Abstract
We study the prices that individual banks pay for liquidity (captured by borrowing rates in repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap) as a function of market conditions and bank characteristics. These prices depend in particular on the distribution of liquidity across banks, which is calculated over time using individual bank-level data on reserve requirements and actual holdings. Banks pay more for liquidity when positions are more imbalanced across banks, consistent with the existence of short squeezing. We also show that small banks pay more for liquidity and are more vulnerable to squeezes. Healthier banks pay less but, contrary to what one might expect, banks in formal liquidity networks do not. State guarantees reduce the price of liquidity but do not protect against squeezes.
JEL Code
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
D44 : Microeconomics→Market Structure and Pricing→Auctions
Network
ECB Lamfalussy Fellowship Programme