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Bianca Barbaro

18 March 2021
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2531
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Abstract
We build a business cycle model characterized by endogenous firms dynamics, where banks may prefer debt renegotiation, i.e. non-performing exposures, to outright borrowers default. We find that debt renegotiations only do not have adverse effects in the event of financial crisis episodes, but a large share of non-performing firms is associated with a sharp deterioration of economic activity in two cases. First, if there are congestion effects in banks ability to monitor non-performing loans. Second, if such loans adversely affect the commercial banks’ moral hazard problem due to their opacity. Aggressive interest rate reductions and quantitative easing limit defaults and the output contraction caused by a financial crisis, without ad- verse effects on the entry of new, more productive firms. The model shows that the observed long-run trend in the share of non-performing loans might be caused by the persistent reduction in technological advancements which drive firm entry rates and firms turnover.
JEL Code
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
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ECB Lamfalussy Fellowship Programme