SØGEMULIGHEDER
Hjem Medier Explainers Forskning & Offentliggørelser Statistik Pengepolitik €uroen Betalinger & Markeder Kariere & Job
Forslag
Sortér efter
Findes ikke på dansk

Gianluca Santilli

26 July 2024
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2959
Details
Abstract
In the aftermath of the European sovereign debt crisis, the question of who should bear the burden of banking crises has been a cornerstone of the new supervisory framework in Europe. We evaluate the bail-in regulation (BRRD) for bank bond holdings using a proprietary database covering holdings of all euro-denominated securities. We focus on hard-to-value bailinable bank bonds and show that banks increased their holdings of bailinable bank bonds while households and non-financial corporations reduced their holdings of bailinable bonds issued by riskier banks.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

Vi bruger cookies på vores websted

Vi bruger funktionelle cookies til at lagre brugerpræferencer, analysecookies til at forbedre webstedets resultater, tredjepartscookies, der er fastsat af tredjepartstjenester, der er integreret på webstedet. Du kan vælge at acceptere eller afvise dem. For yderligere oplysninger eller for at gennemgå din præference for de cookies og serverlogfiler, vi bruger, opfordrer vi dig til: