Discussion of "Credit Booms, Financial Crises and Macroprudential Policy" by Mark Gertler, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Andrea Prestipino

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European Central Bank workshop Monetary Policy and Financial Stability

The views expressed on this discussion are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank

What it does

1. Develop macro model of banking panics and boom-bust cycles

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Study macroprudential regulation in that model (state-contigent leverage requirements for banks)

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Banking panics

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Banking panics

→ Same as Gertler, Kiyotaki and Prestipino (2018)

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- \rightarrow Shocks to fundamentals + Failure to roll over debt + ...
 - \dots + Self-fulfilling beliefs + Sunspots

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Boom-bust cycles NEW !!!

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→ News shocks to fundamentals + Banks' optimism

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 - \circ + News shock \rightarrow \uparrow Tobin's Q & Banks' borrowing capacity

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 - \circ + News shock \rightarrow \uparrow Tobin's Q & Banks' borrowing capacity
 - \circ Optimism $\rightarrow \uparrow$ (Perceived) Tobin's Q & Banks' borrowing capacity
 - 2. Study macroprudential regulation in that model

Main results

1. Banking panics → Bank runs & Amplification effects

2. Banking panics + News-driven optimism $\rightarrow \uparrow$ Amplification effects Boom-bust cycles

3. Optimal regulation \rightarrow Macroprudential requirement binds when banks' net worth attains intermediate values


My comments

Q: Is news-driven optimism really needed to generate boom-bust cycles in Gertler-Karadi-Kiyotaki economy?

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
A: Not sure! Let's look at a continuous-time version of that economy...

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
→ based on Van der Ghote (2016)

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
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
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
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



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
Takeaways

- → News-driven optimism does not seem necessary to generate boom-bust cycles
- → News shocks and/or bank's optimism just amplify those cycles
- → If willing to stick with news-driven optimism, it would be useful to provide further empirical justification!









Questions to addressed

On determinants of optimal macroprudential interventions

 → What determines region in which macroprudential leverage requirements become binding?
Does probability of bank run matter?
Why does not binding status of IC constraint matter?

On effects of macroprudential policy

What is the effect of macroprudential leverage requirements on frequency and intensity of bank runs? And on amplitude and duration of boom-bust cycles?

#3: Interactions with monetary policy



RTF Day-After Workshop

Monetary Policy, MacroPrudential Policy and Financial Stability

19 December 2018 (9:30-14:30)

C2.01, Main Building

#3: Interactions with monetary policy

Questions for further research...

- → What is the effect of monetary policy on probability and intensity of bank runs?
 - And on amplitude and duration of boom-bust cycles?

→ Should monetary policy clean, lean or not respond to financial stability concerns?

Conclusion


What this paper does


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Very interesting paper! Highly recommended

Banking panics + News-driven optimism







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