The Secular Stagnation of Investment?

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Investment and Operating Profits

• Net investment rate

$$x_t \equiv rac{I_t}{K_t} - \delta_t = rac{K_{t+1} - K_t}{K_t}$$

• Net operating return

$$\frac{P_t Y_t - \delta_t P_t^k K_t - W_t N_t - T_t^y}{P_t^k K_t}$$

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Fact 1: Business is Profitable but does not Invest

Figure: x_t and operating return



Notes: Annual data for Non financial Business sector (Corporate and Non corporate).

Fact 1: Business is Profitable but does not Invest

Figure: x_t / Operating Surplus



Notes: Annual data for Non financial Business sector (Corporate and Non corporate) 🤄 no q (

Q-Theory

• FOC
$$x_t = \frac{1}{\gamma}(Q_t - 1)$$

• Tobin's Q
$$Q_t \equiv \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \left[\Lambda_{t+1} V_{t+1}\right]}{P_t^k K_{t+1}}$$

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Fact 2: I/K is low while Q is High



Note: Annual data. Q for Non Financial Corporate sector from Financial Accounts.

Theory

- Theories that predict low I/K because they predict low Q
 - E.g.: spreads & risk premia, low expected growth, savings glut, regulatory uncertainty...

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- Solve the wrong puzzle: Q is high, but l/κ is low.
- Theories that predict a \underline{gap} between Q and l/κ
 - gap between average Q and marginal Q
 - gap between Q and manager's objective function

Gutiérrez & Philippon (2016)

- Use industry and firm level data
- Investment gap *NOT* explained by credit constraints, safety premium, intangibles, globalization, regulation,...
- Only two robust explanatory variables
 - lack of competition
 - governance
- Fact 3: Concentration Explains Gap in Micro Data

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Fact 4: Gap Starts in 2000





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Concentration & Entry



Model: Households

• Preferences

$$\mathbb{E}_0\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\beta^t\left(\frac{C_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}-\frac{N_t^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi}\right)\right],$$

- Wages setting à la Calvo
- Kernel

$$\mathbb{E}_t\left[\Lambda_{t+1}\frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}}\tilde{R}_{t+1}\right] = 1$$

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Model: Capital Producers

• Firm Value

$$V_t = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t,t+j} Div_{t+j}$$

Accumulation

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta_t) K_t + I_t$$

• Payments

$$Div_t = R_{k,t}K_t - P_{k,t}I_t - \frac{\varphi_k}{2}P_{k,t}K_t\left(\frac{I_t}{K_t} - \delta_t\right)^2.$$

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Model: Final Producers

Objective

$$min^{W}/PN + R_kK$$

s.t.
$$Y = AK^{\alpha}N^{1-\alpha}$$

• Price setting à la Calvo, desired markup

$$\mu_t = \frac{\varepsilon_t}{\varepsilon_t - 1}$$

• Market Value of Producers

$$V_{t}^{\varepsilon} = P_{t}Y_{t}(1 - \mathtt{MC}_{t}) - \Phi_{t} + \mathbb{E}_{t}\left[\Lambda_{t+1}V_{t+1}^{\varepsilon}\right]$$

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Micro Calibration

• Firm *i* in industry *j*

$$C_{j,t} = \left(\int_0^j C_{i,j,t}^{\frac{\varepsilon_{j,t}-1}{\varepsilon_{j,t}}} di\right)^{\frac{\varepsilon_{j,t}}{\varepsilon_{j,t}-1}} C_t = \left(\int_0^1 C_{j,t}^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} dj\right)^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$$

- Desired markup: $\frac{P_{j,t}}{P_t} = \mu_{j,t} MC_t$ where $\mu_{j,t} = \frac{\varepsilon_{j,t}}{\varepsilon_{j,t}-1}$
- Capital demand

$$\log K_{j,t} = A_t - \varepsilon \log \mu_{j,t}$$

• Estimate in panel of industries

$$\log \bar{\mu}_t = \log rac{arepsilon_t}{arepsilon_t - 1} pprox 1.3 \bar{\chi}_t$$

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Shocks



Counter-Factual







Counter-Factual



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EXTRA: Shocks

• TFP

$$a_t = \rho_a a_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{a,t}$$

Discount rate shock to the pricing kernel

$$\lambda_{t+1} = \log \beta - \gamma(c_{t+1} - c_t) + \zeta_t^d$$
$$\zeta_t^d = \rho_d \zeta_{t-1}^d + \varepsilon_t^d$$

• Risk premium on corporate assets

$$q_t^k = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\lambda_{t+1} + \log \left(r_{t+1}^k + q_{t+1} + 1 - \delta + \frac{1}{2\gamma} q_{t+1}^2 \right) \right] + \zeta_t^q$$

• Time-varying elasticity of substitution between goods

$$\varepsilon_t = \varepsilon_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^{\varepsilon}$$

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