

Trade Costs and Inflation Dynamics

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Globalization, Trade Disruptions, and Macro Dynamics

- ▶ Deeply interconnected global economy.
- ▶ Trade disruptions (shocks to broadly-defined **trade costs**) → significant macroeconomic consequences, particularly on **inflation**.
 - Trade policies, supply-chain disruptions, geopolitical tensions.
- ▶ Limited understanding of how trade costs affect inflation.
 - Relative or aggregate prices? One-time price increase or persistent inflation?
 - Existing studies focus on **real effects** of trade costs.
 - Divide between international trade and workhorse international monetary models.
 - First-order **relevance** for policy.

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This Paper

► **Question:** How do trade costs affect inflation dynamics?

- Higher costs $\Rightarrow$ $\downarrow$ supply shock ($\uparrow \pi$, $\downarrow Y$);
 $\Rightarrow$ trade in intermediates key for transmission and magnitudes.

1. **Empirical analysis.**

- Gravity + World IO data $\Rightarrow$ bilateral trade costs, final & interm. (41 countries, 95-20)
→ Aggregate bilateral costs $\Rightarrow$ import costs.
- Panel LPs (Jordà, 2005) $\Rightarrow$ variation across time and space in import costs
→ Estimate effects on CPI inflation, GDP,...

2. **Quantitative framework.**

- Dynamic multicountry GE model $\rightarrow$ trade in final and interm. (gravity) + sticky prices.
- Calibrate, test against empirical results, and unpack mechanisms.

3. **Model experiments.**

- Monetary pol. alternatives / 2018-19 U.S.-China trade war / Post-pandemic inflation.

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Preview of key results (+ some existing literature)

- ▶ **Empirical Analysis** Barattieri-Cacciatore-Ghironi (2021), Furceri et al. (2020),...
 - Higher import costs $\Rightarrow \uparrow \pi, \downarrow Y$; π dynamics depend on type of shock:
 - + Final goods $\rightarrow$ large but short-lived inflation.
 - + Intermediate inputs $\rightarrow$ smaller but longer-lasting inflation.
- ▶ **Quantitative framework** Comin-Johnson (2022), di Giovanni et al. (2024), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2025), Auclert et al. (2025),...
 - Model replicates estimated inflation and GDP dynamics:
 - + Higher costs intermediates $\rightarrow$ persistent $\uparrow$ firms' MCs $\rightarrow$ persistent increase in π .
 - + 10 p.p. $\uparrow$ in total U.S. import costs $\Rightarrow$ 0.8 p.p. $\uparrow$ in π on impact, persists for extra three years.
- ▶ **Model experiments** Bianchi & Coulibaly (2025), Werning-Lorenzoni-Guerrieri (2025),...
 - Key insights:
 - + Intermediates undo advantage of PPI targeting ("look-through" MP).
 - + U.S.-China 18-19 trade war: U.S. CPI $\uparrow$ by more than 0.4 percent due to persistence.
 - + Trade costs: (i) prevented deflation during COVID-19 and (ii) increased inflation in 2022-23.

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Empirics

Measuring Trade Costs

Armington Model of Trade

- ▶ Global economy comprised of countries indexed $i, h \in \mathcal{I} = \{1, \dots, N\}$.
 - * Each country produces a single tradable good.
- ▶ Goods used as either final consumption (C) or intermediate production inputs (M).
- ▶ Differentiated goods aggregated as

$$Q_{i,t} = \left(\sum_{h=1}^N (Q_{ih,t})^{\frac{\eta^Q - 1}{\eta^Q}} \right)^{\frac{\eta^Q}{\eta^Q - 1}}, \quad Q \in \{C, M\}$$

- ▶ **Trade costs:** Delivering 1 unit requires shipping $\tau_{ih,t}^Q \geq 1$ units ($\tau_{ii,t}^Q = 1$).
- ▶ Assume *law of one price* holds.

Measuring Trade Costs (Cont'd)

► Let $X_{ih,t}^Q \equiv P_{ih,t}^Q Q_{ih,t}$, $X_{i,t}^Q = \sum_{h=1}^N X_{ih,t}^Q$.

► Cost minimization → **Gravity**:

$$\frac{X_{ih,t}^Q}{X_{i,t}^Q} \equiv \omega_{ih,t}^Q = \left(\frac{\tau_{ih,t}^Q P_{ih,t}}{P_{i,t}^Q} \right)^{-(\eta^Q - 1)}, \quad P_{ih,t} \equiv \varepsilon_{ih,t} P_{h,t}$$

► Combine to obtain measure of trade costs between country pairs (Head-Ries index):

$$\tau_{ih,t}^Q \equiv (\tau_{ih,t}^Q \tau_{hi,t}^Q)^{\frac{1}{2}} = \left(\frac{\omega_{ih,t}}{\omega_{hh,t}} \frac{\omega_{hi,t}}{\omega_{ii,t}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{2(\eta^Q - 1)}}$$

► **Takeaway:** Bilateral expenditure shares + trade elasticity → measure of trade costs.

Data

OECD ICIO Tables (World Input-Output Database):

- ▶ Yearly data:
 - * ICIO: 1995-2020, 41 countries, 16 non-service sectors (consistent with WIOD).
- ▶ Construct **bilateral trade costs** for final goods and intermediate inputs.

World Development Indicators:

- ▶ CPI inflation, Real GDP, Real Exports, Real Imports, Real Exchange Rate.

Global Crises Database:

- ▶ Country-specific controls for currency and banking crises.


Trade elasticity:

- ▶ $\eta \equiv \eta^C = \eta^M = 5$ Head-Ries (2001), Simonovska-Waugh (2014), Caliendo-Parro (2014).


Bilateral Trade Costs Across Time and Space

Costs vary over time (reflecting integration) and across space (reflecting economic development); they also reflect changes in trade policy

Δ in median trade costs



Δ in trade costs, main U.S. trade partners



Import Costs

Measured trade costs correlate with import tariffs


- We aggregate bilateral trade costs to country-level **import costs** using import shares:

$$\tau_{i,t}^Q = \sum_{h=1}^N \left(\frac{X_{ih,t}^Q}{\sum_{k \neq i} X_{ik,t}^Q} \right) \tau_{ih,t}^Q$$

for $Q \in \{C, M\}$.

* Estimate $\hat{\beta} = 1.1$ from

$$\log \tau_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta \log(1 + \text{tariff}_{i,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,t}.$$



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
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
How do trade cost shocks affect inflation? Scatter

$$\pi_{i,t+h} = \delta_{i,h}^Q + \delta_{t,h}^Q + \beta_h^Q \cdot \Delta\tau_{i,t}^Q + \gamma_h^Q \cdot \Delta\tau_{i,t}^\emptyset + \Gamma_h'^Q Z_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t+h}^Q \quad \text{for } h \geq 1, \quad Q = \{C, M\}.$$


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Inflation response, final's trade costs




Inflation response, interm.'s trade costs



GDP Effects: Trade cost shocks are negative supply shocks

$$\log GDP_{i,t+h} - \log GDP_{i,t} = \delta_{i,h}^Q + \delta_{t,h}^Q + \beta_h^Q \cdot \Delta \tau_{i,t}^Q + \gamma_h^Q \cdot \Delta \tau_{i,t}^{\emptyset} + \Gamma_h'^Q Z_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t+h}^Q \text{ for } h \geq 1, Q = \{C, M\}.$$

GDP response, final's trade costs



GDP response, interm.'s trade costs



Model

Model Overview

- Multi-country New Keynesian + trade model.
 - * $N = 5$ countries (U.S., China, Asia excl. China, AFE, ROW).
- New Keynesian bloc:
 - * Nominal rigidity in prices and wages.
 - * Labor and intermediate inputs—domestic and imported—used in production.
- Trade bloc:
 - * Armington model of trade in final consumption and intermediate inputs.
 - * Iceberg trade costs in final consumption and intermediate inputs.

Households

Unit continuum of households indexed by ℓ in each country i maximize:

$$\begin{aligned} \max \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [U_i(C_{i,t}) - V_i(L_{i,t}^{\ell})], \quad C_{i,t} &= \left(\sum_{h=1}^N C_{ih,t}^{\frac{\eta^C - 1}{\eta^C}} \right)^{\frac{\eta^C}{\eta^C - 1}}. \\ \text{s.t. } \sum_{h=1}^N \underbrace{\tau_{ih,t}^C p_{ih,t}^C}_{p_{ih,t}^C} C_{ih,t} + B_{ii,t} + \frac{B_{i1,t}}{\mathcal{E}_{1i,t}} &\leq W_{i,t}^{\ell} L_{i,t}^{\ell} + R_{i,t-1} B_{ii,t-1} + R_{1,t-1} \Psi_{i,t-1} \frac{B_{i1,t-1}}{\mathcal{E}_{1i,t}} + T_{i,t}, \end{aligned}$$

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- o η^C : Elasticity of substitution for final goods (trade elasticity = $\eta^C - 1$)
- o $P_{ih,t}$: price in LCUs at which good produced in h is sold in i (at the dock)
- o $\tau_{ih,t}^C = d_{ih,t}^C (1 + t_{ih,t}^C)$: trade cost (iceberg cost + add-valorem tariff)
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Domestic firms

Unit continuum of differentiated firms indexed by j in each country i have technology

$$Y_{i,t}^j = \left[(1-\nu)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_y}} L_{i,t}^j{}^{\frac{\varepsilon_y-1}{\varepsilon_y}} + \nu^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_y}} M_{i,t}^j{}^{\frac{\varepsilon_y-1}{\varepsilon_y}} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon_y}{\varepsilon_y-1}},$$

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Traded intermediate input

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Intermediate input sourcing: $\min_{M_{ih,t}} \sum_{h=1}^N \underbrace{\tau_{ih,t}^M P_{ih,t}}_{P_{ih,t}^M} M_{ih,t} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad M_{i,t} = \left[\sum_{h=1}^N M_{ih,t}^{\frac{\eta^M-1}{\eta^M}} \right]^{\frac{\eta^M}{\eta^M-1}}.$

- η^M : Elasticity of substitution for intermediate inputs (trade elasticity = $\eta_M - 1$)
- $P_{ih,t}$: price in LCUs at which good produced in h is sold in i (at the dock)
- $\tau_{ih,t}^M = d_{ih,t}^M (1 + t_{ih,t}^M)$ trade cost (iceberg cost + add-valorem tariff)
- $P_{ih,t}^M$: price in LCUs at which good produced in h is sold in i (cum-trade-costs)

Domestic firms

Unit continuum of differentiated firms indexed by j in each country i have technology

$$Y_{i,t}^j = \left[(1-\nu)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon_y}} L_{i,t}^j^{\frac{\epsilon_y-1}{\epsilon_y}} + \nu^{\frac{1}{\epsilon_y}} M_{i,t}^j^{\frac{\epsilon_y-1}{\epsilon_y}} \right]^{\frac{\epsilon_y}{\epsilon_y-1}},$$

Domestic labor input

Traded intermediate input

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Retail firms: final tradable good producers

- Produce homogeneous output $Y_{i,t}$ aggregating domestic varieties:

$$Y_{i,t} = \left(\int_0^1 Y_{i,t}^j \frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon} dj \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}$$

Homogeneous output → used domestically (consumption or input) or exported

- Producer currency pricing ⇒ LOP holds.
- Nominal rigidities:** Firms can only reset prices with probability θ .

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Calibration and functional forms

- ▶ Country heterogeneity only in trade shares and pop. size.
- ▶ Assume trade costs are of the form

$$\tau_{ih,t}^Q = \left(\omega_{ih}^Q \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta_Q}} \varepsilon_{ih,t}^Q$$





where ω_{ih}^Q are time-invariant and $\sum_{h=1}^N \omega_{ih}^Q = 1$, and $\varepsilon_{ih,t}^Q$ are stationary shocks.

- ▶ Log-linear approximation of model around its steady state under balanced trade.
 - * Balanced trade ($NX = 0$) $\Rightarrow$ calibrate half of ω s, rest determined by restrictions.
- ▶ Households' preferences:

$$U_i(C_{i,t}, C_{i,t-1}) = \frac{(C_{i,t} - hC_{i,t-1})^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} \quad \text{and} \quad V_i(L_{i,t}^\ell) = \frac{L_{i,t}^{\ell \, 1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi},$$







Model v. Data

Differential response to a 10 p.p. transitory increase in trade costs for **average country**



10 p.p. increase in U.S. trade costs

Higher τ^M increase real MC and lead to **more prolonged stagflationary dynamics**



Experiments

Experiments

► Monetary policy rules

Results MP

- * Compare baseline (CPI-targeting) rule w/ rule targeting PPI inflation (“see-through” MP).
- * **Intermediates** undo advantages of PPI targeting.

► Macroeconomic effects of US-China 2018-19 trade war

Results US-China TW

- * **Calibrate trade costs** based on U.S.-China tariffs and measure of **bilateral** costs.
- * U.S. CPI ↑ by more than 0.4%, tariffs on **interm.** explain bulk of π persistence and GDP ↓.

► Trade costs and post-pandemic U.S. inflation

Results Decomposition

- * **Estimate** model of U.S. vs Rest-of-World (ROW).
- * Extensions for empirical realism: LCP, trade inertia, wage and price indexation.
- * Trade costs prevented (i) deflation during COVID-19 and (ii) lower inflation in 2022-23.

Conclusion

Conclusion

- ▶ **Increases in trade costs are inflationary.**
 - Inflation dynamics depend on good type: Transitory for finished consumption goods, persistent for intermediate production inputs.
- ▶ **Model replicates empirical responses of macro variables to trade cost shocks.**
 - Intermediates trade costs reduce production efficiency, raise domestic firms' marginal cost.
- ▶ **Ongoing work (w/ Schott & Bodenstein):** Optimal monetary policy response to tariffs.
 - Quantitative framework.
 - Allow for inflation inertia (proxying for de-anchoring of π expectations).


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
Appendix

Trade Costs Across Time and Space

Evolution of distribution (all 41 countries)




Evolution of medians by country group



Empirics

Historical Evolution of Global Trade Costs


Median Trade Cost: Final Goods (C)



Note: Shaded areas are bounded by the 20th and 80th percentiles.

[Back](#)

Median Trade Cost: Intermediate Goods (M)




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
Empirics: Trade Costs and inflation

Import Costs and Inflation in the Data

Trade costs in final goods and inflation



Trade costs in intermediate goods and inflation



[Back](#)

Model: Risk Premium

- Maximization by household ℓ is subject to

$$\sum_{h=1}^N \underbrace{\tau_{ih,t}^C P_{ih,t}}_{P_{ih,t}^C} C_{ih,t} + B_{ii,t} + \frac{B_{1i,t}}{\mathcal{E}_{1i,t}} \leq W_{i,t}^\ell L_{i,t}^\ell + R_{i,t-1} B_{ii,t-1} + R_{1,t-1} \Psi_{i,t-1} \frac{B_{i1,t-1}}{\mathcal{E}_{1i,t}} + T_{i,t},$$

where $P_{ih,t} = \mathcal{E}_{ih,t} P_{h,t}$ and

- * $B_{ih,t}$: holdings of country h 's bond,
- * $\mathcal{E}_{ih,t}$: country i 's nominal exchange rate v. country h (country 1 is the U.S.),
- * $P_{h,t}$: price in LCUs at which good produced in h is sold in h ,
- * $\tau_{ih,t}^C = d_{ih,t}^C (1 + t_{ih,t}^C)$: exogenous trade cost (iceberg cost + add-valorem tariff),
- * $\Psi_{i,t-1}$: currency risk premium (for $i = 2, \dots, N$) such that

$$\Psi_{i,t} = (1 - \psi \frac{b_{i1,t}}{Q_{1i,t} Y_{i,t}}) \varepsilon_{i,t}^\psi$$

where $b_{i1,t} \equiv \frac{B_{i1,t}}{P_{1,t}^C}$, $Q_{1i,t} \equiv \frac{\mathcal{E}_{1i,t} P_{i,t}}{P_{1,t}}$, and $\varepsilon_{i,t}^\psi$ is AR(1).

Model

Wage setting

- A labor union in each i aggregates labor varieties according to $L_{i,t} = \left(\int_0^1 L_{i,t}^\ell \frac{\epsilon_w - 1}{\epsilon_w} d\ell \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_w}{\epsilon_w - 1}}$.
- Demand for labor variety ℓ

$$L_{i,t}^\ell = \left(\frac{W_{i,t}^\ell}{W_{i,t}} \right)^{-\epsilon_w} L_{i,t},$$

where

$$W_{i,t} = \left(\int_0^1 W_{i,t}^\ell {}^{1-\epsilon_w} d\ell \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon_w}}$$

- Household ℓ can reset the nominal wage $W_{i,t}^\ell$ only with prob. $1 - \theta_w$, and with prob. θ_w must set the previous-period nominal wage $W_{i,t-1}^\ell$.

Monetary policy and market clearing

- Central bank in each country follows inertial Taylor rule:

$$R_{i,t} = (R_{i,t-1})^{\phi_r} \left(\frac{1}{\beta} (\pi_{i,t})^{\phi_\pi} \left(\frac{GDP_{i,t}}{GDP_{i,t}^*} \right)^{\phi_y} \right)^{1-\phi_r}.$$

- * $\pi_{i,t}$ is CPI inflation and $GDP_{i,t}^*$ is the *flex-price* level of GDP
- * Details of the policy rule are crucial for transmission into real activity and prices

- Market clearing: For $i = 1, \dots, N$,

$$\xi_i Y_{i,t} = \sum_{h=1}^N \xi_h (d_{hi,t}^C C_{hi,t} + d_{hi,t}^M M_{hi,t}),$$

where ξ_i is country i 's population (all variables are in per-capita terms).

- Standard definition of equilibrium with balanced government budget and balanced trade

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- Standard definition of equilibrium with balanced government budget and balanced trade

Calibration: Macro Parameters

Parameter	Description	Value
β	Discount factor	0.99
σ	Inverse IES	0.5
h	Habit	0.75
η	Trade substitution elasticity consumption	5
η_m	Trade substitution elasticity intermediates	5
ϕ	Inverse labor supply elasticity	2
ϵ	Home varieties' substitution elasticity	6
ϵ_w	Labor varieties' substitution elasticity	6
θ, θ_w	Price, wage rigidity	0.80
ν	Intermediates weight in production	0.4
ϵ_y	Intermediates-labor substitution elasticity	0.5
ϕ_π	Taylor rule inflation coefficient	1.5
ϕ_y	Taylor rule output coefficient	0.2
ϕ_r	Taylor rule inertia	0.75
ψ	Risk premium elasticity to NFA	0.001

Calibration: Trade Parameters

Parameter	Description	Value
ρ_{τ}	Trade cost shock autocorrelation	0.95
$[U.S., China, Asia, AE, ROW]$	Region size	[.20,.19,.19,.27,.14]


Consumption Expenditure Shares

	Source			
	U.S.	China	Asia	AE
U.S.	0.94	0.012	0.004	0.021
China		0.95	0.009	0.02
Asia			0.94	0.014
AE				0.94

Intermediate Expenditure Shares


	Source			
	U.S.	China	Asia	AE
U.S.	0.88	0.025	0.007	0.04
China		0.94	0.01	0.014
Asia			0.81	0.045
AE				0.89

10 p.p. increase in U.S. trade costs



Model Experiments


Effects on the U.S. of an increase in intermediates trade costs, role of ε_y



Note: Effects of a 10 percentage point increase in the U.S.'s trade costs from all trading partners on intermediate inputs, baseline calibration with intermediates-labor substitution elasticity $\varepsilon_y = 0.5$ (red solid), $\varepsilon_y = 0.05$ (yellow dashed), and $\varepsilon_y = 1.5$ (green dotted).

Model Experiments







Effects on the U.S. of an increase in intermediates trade costs, role of ν



Note: Effects of a 10 percentage point increase in the U.S.'s trade costs from all trading partners on intermediate inputs, baseline calibration with share of intermediates in production $\nu = 0.4$ (red solid), $\nu = 0.5$ (yellow dashed), and $\nu_y = 0.3$ (green dotted).







Model Experiments: 10 p.p. transitory increase in trade costs

Impulse responses





Note: Effects of a 10 percentage point increase in the U.S.'s trade costs from all trading partners.

Monetary Policy: CPI v. PPI Rule (permanent trade shock)





2018-19 U.S.-China trade tensions, effects on U.S.

- Calibrate trade costs based on tariffs imposed by the U.S. and China's response
- Increase in average bilateral tariff in line with measured bilateral trade costs
- Tariffs on interm. inputs explain the bulk of inflation persistence and drag on GDP



2018-19 U.S.-China trade tensions, effects on other regions

- Muted inflationary effects in foreign regions outside China
- Unaffected regions benefited modestly from trade diversion



Estimation of model of U.S. vs Rest-of-World (ROW)

Extend model to add quantitative realism: LCP, trade inertia, wage and price indexation

Two-step approach:

- ▶ Estimate model with data from 1999:Q1 - 2019:Q4
- ▶ Filter shocks from 2020:Q1-2023:Q4

Standard macro data and shocks

- ▶ U.S.: GDP growth, CPI inflation, nominal interest rate
- ▶ ROW: GDP growth, CPI inflation, nominal interest rate, U.S./ROW real exchange rate
- ▶ Shocks: TFP ($\times 2$), Demand ($\times 2$), Monetary Policy ($\times 2$), UIP.


Trade data and trade shocks

- ▶ **New data:** quarterly domestic sourcing shares for final and intermediate goods
- ▶ **New shocks:** trade costs for final ($\tau_{US,ROW}^C$) and intermediate goods ($\tau_{US,ROW}^M$)

U.S. sourcing shares







Identification

Significant Effect of Trade Costs During the Pandemic Inflation



Monetary Policy Response










Transitory Tariffs



Note: Effects of a 10 percentage point increase in the U.S.'s trade costs from all trading partners.


Extensions

Trade adjustment costs, capital utilization, investment (domestic and imported), LCP, financial frictions




Note: Effects of a permanent 10 percentage point increase in U.S.'s trade costs from all trading partners.

U.S. Quarterly Domestic Sourcing Shares



Notes: U.S. sourcing shares interpolated from BEA input-output tables. The blue line corresponds to the domestic sourcing share of final goods. The red line depicts the domestic sourcing share for intermediate inputs. Sourcing shares correspond to tradable sectors in accordance to standard NAICS classification.

Identification of Trade Cost Shocks



Notes: Impulse response to a one standard deviation to total factor productivity shock (blue), trade cost shock for final goods (red), trade cost shock for intermediate inputs (yellow). Model calibrated at the estimated posterior mean parameters.