# Discussion of "Fiscal Policy and the Distribution of Consumption Rik" by M.M. Croce, T.T. Nguyen and L Schmid

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• Analyze fiscal policy design in a model with realistic macro-finance implications

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- Normative: optimal fiscal policy in an economy with empirically plausible asset pricing implications

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- Tradeoff: short-run stabilization vs long-run risk

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- No physical capital

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- Key intratemporal condition shows distortionary effect of fiscal policy (tax on labor):

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• When  $\tau_t$  increases, ceteris paribus, endogenous  $L_t$  falls to satisfy condition

## Technology

Final good firms

$$Y_t = \Omega_t L_t^{1-lpha} \left[ \int_0^{A_t} X_{it}^{lpha} di 
ight]$$

 $\Omega_t$  is exogenous stationary productivity process and  $A_t$  is the measure of intermediate goods, firm picks  $L_t$  and  $X_{it}$ 

 Intermediate good firms are monopolists charging a constant markup over marginal cost

$$P_{it} = P = \frac{1}{\alpha}$$

• Output from these choices can then be shown to follow

$$Y_t = \frac{1}{\alpha^2} A_t L_t (\Omega_t \alpha^2)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$

Since  $L_t$  and  $\Omega_t$  are stationary, growth in output can only come from  $A_t$  (intermediate goods variety).



- Innovators get patents for intermediate goods that they sell. Obsolescence with probability  $\delta$
- Value cum dividend of an existing variety

$$V_{it} = \Pi_{it} + \phi E_t \left( M_{t+1} V_{it+1} \right)$$

Let 1/θ<sub>t</sub> be marginal rate of transformation of final goods into new varieties. Free entry in R&D:

$$\frac{1}{\vartheta_t} = E_t \left( M_{t+1} V_{it+1} \right)$$

Variety follows

$$A_{t+1} = (1-\delta)A_t + \vartheta_t S_t$$

where  $S_t$  denotes the units of final goods invested in R&D.

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- Value of all three sectors: final, intermediate and R&D
- No profits from final and R&D, intermediate sector profits minus investment equals dividends
- Stock market value

$$Q_t = rac{1-\delta}{artheta_t} {\sf A}_t$$

Innovation intensity now positively related to future growth prospects

• The growth rate in the economy is

$$\frac{A_{t+1}}{A_t} = 1 + \delta + E_t \left[ \chi^2 M_{t+1} V_{t+1} \right]^{\frac{1-\eta}{\eta}}$$

$$\beta(\frac{u_{t+1}}{u_t})^k (\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t})^{-1/\nu} \left[\frac{U_{t+1}^{1-\gamma}}{E_t U_{t+1}^{1-\gamma}}\right]^{\frac{1/\psi-\gamma}{1-\gamma}}$$

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- Importance of long run risk and preference specification
- Tradeoff between short run stabilization and long run growth

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- Why is unconditional average of debt to gdp 10%?

### Simple Exogenous Fiscal Policy

- Exogenous AR(1) process for G/Y
- Government can use tax income  $\tau_t W_t L_t$  or public debt to finance G
- Fiscal Policy rule

$$\begin{array}{lll} \frac{B_t}{Y_t} &=& \rho_B \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} + \epsilon_t \\ \epsilon_t &=& \phi_B (\log L_{SS} - \log L_t) \end{array} \end{array}$$

All welfare analysis hinges on  $\phi_B$ :

If  $\phi_B = 0$ , then no change in taxes. As  $\phi_B$  rises then there is more care for stabilization policy (which is done through tax variation).

• Government and productivity shock illustrate short-run stabilization versus long run risk tradeoff

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- With tax smoothing, drop in output growth reduced at impact, but amplifies drop in expected long run growth

### • Compare value functions with a certain $\phi_B$ versus $\phi_B = 0$ .

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- Compare value functions with a certain  $\phi_B$  versus  $\phi_B = 0$ .
- Welfare costs of tax-smoothing increasing in  $\phi_B, \rho_B$

- Based on welfare results, is zero tax-smoothing optimal? This result depends on debt evolution: could this not be grounded more closely to empirical work?
- e Effect is coming from intermediate sector: How big could this magnitude be in the data given size of intermediate sector?

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- But does this generate empirically relevant debt/gdp evolution?
- Could another approach be to make welfare calculations subject to a host of exogenous fiscal policy experiments with more realistic debt/gdp processes?

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- This is not a production economy setting: how different are the proposed channels?

• Nice paper integrating realistic asset pricing implications with normative aspects of fiscal policy